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THERE IS ALWAYS A BETTER WAY: PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT SYSTEM
Jim Moye *
"The Federal Government has an overriding obligation to American taxpayers.
It should perform its functions efficiently and effectively while ensuring that its
actions result in the best value for the taxpayers. "
On March 4, 2009, United States President Barack Obama issued a
memorandum roundly criticizing the Federal Government's poor handling
of its contracts and procurement process. 2 The President noted that since
2001, spending on Federal Government contracts had increased to over
$500 billion in the 2008 Fiscal Year.3 He further stated that the Federal
Government relied more on sole source contracts4 and had expanded
outsourcing of services.5 In an effort to correct these issues, the President
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1. See Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Mar. 4, 2009.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
Excessive reliance by executive agencies on sole-source contracts (or contracts with a
limited number of sources) and cost-reimbursement contracts creates a risk that taxpayer
funds will be spent on contracts that are wasteful, inefficient, subject to misuse, or
otherwise not well designed to serve the needs of the Federal Government or the interests
of the American taxpayer. Reports by agency Inspectors General, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), and other independent reviewing bodies have shown that
noncompetitive and cost-reimbursement contracts have been misused, resulting in wasted
taxpayer resources, poor contractor performance, and inadequate accountability for
results.
Id.
5. See id.
Government outsourcing for services also raises special concerns. For decades, the
Federal Government has relied on the private sector for necessary commercial services
used by the Government, such as transportation, food, and maintenance. Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-76, first issued in 1966, was based on the reasonable
premise that while inherently governmental activities should be performed by
1
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instructed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to assist all federal
agencies by conducting immediate reviews, and continuing reviews of,
existing contracts. 6 Also, the President directed OMB to develop and issue
guidelines concerning closer governance of sole source contracts and the
appropriate use of all contract types, including government outsourcing, as
well as training guidelines for procurement personnel. 7
On June 14, 2010, a study entitled "Federal Procurement Reform:
Change Takes More Than Words", was released by MeriTalk, the Federal
Government's Information Technology Network.8 The study, based on
surveys completed by 200 procurement personnel members, revealed,
Government employees, taxpayers may receive more value for their dollars if non-
inherently governmental activities that can be provided commercially are subject to the
forces of competition.
Id.
6. Memorandum on Government Contracting, supra note 2.
[I] hereby direct the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in
collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Administrator of General Services, the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and the heads of such other agencies as
the Director of OMB determines to be appropriate, and with the participation of
appropriate management councils and program management officials, to develop and
issue by July 1, 2009, Government-wide guidance to assist agencies in reviewing, and
creating processes for ongoing review of, existing contracts in order to identify contracts
that are wasteful, inefficient, or not otherwise likely to meet the agency's needs, and to
formulate appropriate corrective action in a timely manner. Such corrective action may
include modifying or canceling such contracts in a manner and to the extent consistent
with applicable laws, regulations, and policy.
Id.
7. Id.
I further direct the Director of OMB, in collaboration with the aforementioned officials
and councils, and with input from the public, to develop and issue by September 30,
2009, Government-wide guidance to:
(1) govern the appropriate use and oversight of sole-source and other types of
noncompetitive contracts and to maximize the use of full and open competition and other
competitive procurement processes;
(2) govern the appropriate use and oversight of all contract types, in full consideration of
the agency's needs, and to minimize risk and maximize the value of Government
contracts generally, consistent with the regulations to be promulgated pursuant to section
864 of Public Law 110-417;
(3) assist agencies in assessing the capacity and ability of the Federal acquisition
workforce to develop, manage, and oversee acquisitions appropriately; and
(4) clarify when governmental outsourcing for services is and is not appropriate,
consistent with section 321 of Public Law 110-417 (31 U.S.C. 501 note).
Id.
8. FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REFORM: CHANGES TAKE MoRE THAN WoRDs, MERITALK, (June 14,
2010),
http://www.meritalk.com/pdfs/MeriTalk%/ 20Federal%/ 20Procurement%/20Reform% /20Report%/2006021
0.pdf
2
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amongst other things, that federal agency procurement offices needed to
improve processes, focus on training, and increase transparency. 9 The
survey also noted that the procurement managers believed that they could
save over $158 billion with improved processes." Finally, the report found
only twelve percent of procurement managers gave their agencies an "A"
grade for procurement process maturity1 1 and that twenty-eight percent of
federally contracted programs were not delivered on time or within the
stated budget.12
The President's Executive Memorandum and the MeriTalk report lead to
a difficult conclusion. First, the Federal Government is investing
significant taxpayer dollars for contracting. In fact, hundreds of billions of
dollars are flowing from the Federal Government to private sector
contractors annually for a wide range of services. Second, while
contracting for goods and services is a rapidly growing sector of the
government, there is also growing concern related to oversight and control.
Third, because of the lack of oversight, this area is vulnerable to fraud,
waste, and abuse.
This Article examines whether legislative and policy changes in the
federal procurement system will result in major financial and integrity
changes. Note that while government procurement activities undertaken by
individual states are a substantive part of the Nation's economy, this Article
is restricted to federal procurement law and policy. Part I discusses Title 41
of the United States Code, which provides the statutory authority for all
federal procurement activities. Part I also briefly covers the supporting
regulations known as the Federal Acquisition Rules ("FAR"). Part II
examines the roles, membership and obligations of the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council ("FARC")
and the Chief Acquisition Officers Council and their impact on federal
procurement policy. Part III scrutinizes three major federal procurement
actions which underscore the need for change. Part IV will provide
legislative and policy recommendations to improve the federal procurement
9. See id.
10. See id. at 4. "For purposes of the report, [the authors] define processes as the sum of all steps
agencies take to procure goods and services." Id.
11. Id. The report further noted that thirty-six percent of procurement management officials gave their
agencies a grade of "B", twenty-seven percent gave their agencies a grade of "C", fourteen percent gave
their agencies a grade of "D", four percent gave their agencies a grade of "F," and seven percent were
"unsure." Id.
12. Id. The report noted that the impact of the lateness of service delivery and budget missteps has a
$95 billion impact. Id.
2010]
3
Moye: There is Always a Better Way: Proposed Legislative Improvements f
Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2010
310 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:227
system. This Article concludes that the current statutory framework can be
modified and creative solutions crafted to establish a more thoughtful and
less frenetic federal procurement system.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE GRAY AREA: THE LAW AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING FEDERAL CONTRACTING
A. Title 41
Title 41 of the United States Code, divided into ten separate chapters,
provides the federal statutory authority for all federal procurement
activities.13 The major sections include General Provisions, Termination of
War Contracts, Procurement Procedures, Judicial Review of Administrative
Decisions, Service Contract Labor Standards, and Contract Disputes.
i. General Provisions
Title 41, Chapter 1 provides for General Provisions. First, the section
restricts the government from purchasing and contracting for supplies or
services unless advertised for a sufficient amount of time.14 The provision
grants narrow exceptions to the advertising requirement, based on the
purchase price or exigent circumstances.15 Second, the provision disallows
any contract or purchase that has not been specifically funded, except in
specialized circumstances involving the Department of Defense and the
Department of Homeland Security.16 The section further requires the
13. See generally 41 U.S.C. §§ 1-707 (2006).
14. See 41 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
Unless otherwise provided in the appropriation concerned or other law, purchases and
contracts for supplies or services for the Government may be made or entered into only
after advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals, except (1) when the amount
involved in any one case does not exceed $25,000, (2) when the public exigencies require
the immediate delivery of the articles or performance of the service, (3) when only one
source of supply is available and the Government purchasing or contracting officer shall
so certify, or (4) when the services are required to be performed by the contractor in
person and are (A) of a technical and professional nature or (B) under Government
supervision and paid for on a time basis.
Id.
15. Id.
16. 41 U.S.C. § 11 (2006).
No contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall be made,
unless the same is authorized by law or is under an appropriation
adequate to its fulfillment, except in the Department of Defense and in
4
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 14 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/5
ALWAYS A BETTER WAY
creation and maintenance of a distribution list of contractors who have
breached their contracts.17 Finally, the statute imposes criminal and civil
penalties for violations18  and institutes specified Contractor
responsibilities.1 9
ii. Termination of War Contracts
Title 41, Chapter 2 outlines the process for the termination of war
contracts. Normally, this section would not be particularly relevant;
however, the United States is currently embroiled in conflict abroad and
thus, a brief review of this section is instructive. First, the chapter creates
an administrative board to oversee the winding down and eventual
termination of war contracts.20 This board is composed of, among others,
the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, State, Transportation, and Commerce,
the Administrator of the General Services, and the Attorney General. 21 This
chapter requires the government to develop a thoughtful and thorough
the Department of Homeland Security with respect to the Coast Guard
when it is not operating as a service in the Navy, for clothing,
subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and
hospital supplies, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of the
current year.
Id.
17. 41 U.S.C. § 37 (2006). Requiring the Comptroller General to distribute a list to all agencies the
names of firms that have been found by the Secretary of Labor to have breached their agreements. Id.
Unless otherwise recommended by the Secretary of Labor, the listed firms are to be banned from
receiving future contract awards. Id.
18. 41 U.S.C. §§ 54 (2006) (stating that one who knowingly or willingly violates this section of the law
can be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison and an undefined fine.); 42 U.S.C. § 55 (2006) (stating that
the law allows the Federal Government to recover civil penalties from anyone violating the law by
collecting twice the amount of a kickback and not more than $10,000 per occurrence).
19. See 41 U.S.C. § 57 (2006). The section requires agencies to develop procedural requirements for
prevention and detection of violations, requires cooperation in investigations, has a reporting
requirement and requires cooperation in investigations regardless of the contract size. Id.
20. See 41 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
There is created a Contract Settlement Advisory Board, with which the Administrator of
General Services shall advise and consult. The Board shall be composed of the
Administrator of General Services who shall act as its Chairman, and of the Secretary of
the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of
State, the chairman of the board of directors of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General or any alternate or representative
designated by any of them. The Administrator of General Services shall request other
Government agencies to participate in the deliberations of the Board whenever matters
specially affecting them are under consideration.
Id.
21. Id.
2010]
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contract termination process, 22 creates a basis for settlement of terminated
contracts,23 and provides guidance on the administration of specified
contracts.
24
iii. Procurement Procedures
Within Title 41, Chapter 4 is arguably the most important chapter of the
law as it statutorily outlines the necessary requirements for pre- and post-
award contract administration. 25 The chapter initially requires full and open
competition for all contracts, places strict limits on contracts not meeting
this requirement, and calls for justification for failing to award contracts
without competition. 26 Next, the law requires each agency to engage in
detailed acquisition planning, ensure each solicitation has met basic
standards, and provides requirements for the evaluation factors used in
soliciting contracts. 27 In addition the section discusses the evaluation of
purchase options.28 Third, the law outlines the requirements for agencies
pre-award and post-award debriefings, the process for rejecting bids and
proposals, maintaining bid protest files, and actions subsequent to protest
22. See 41 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (requiring that prime contractors be provided advanced notice of the
termination of war contracts, develop procedures for terminating subcontractors, and allow for the
continuation of some work under the prime contract.
23. See 41 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (providing priority funding for wartime contractors, establishes methods
and standards for determining compensation, defines conclusiveness of settlement, outlines allowable
costs, discusses settlement between the parties and when a contractor is entitled to interest payments)..
24. See 41 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) (dealing with defective, informal or quasi contracts.).
Where any person has arranged to furnish or furnished to a contracting agency or to a war
contractor any materials, services, or facilities related to the prosecution of the war,
without a formal contract, relying in good faith upon the apparent authority of an officer
or agent of a contracting agency, written or oral instructions, or any other request to
proceed from a contracting agency, the contracting agency shall pay such person fair
compensation therefor.
Id.
25. See generally 41 U.S.C. §§ 201-5, §§ 281-91.
26. See 41 U.S.C. § 253 (2006).
27. See 41 U.S.C. § 253a (2006).
28. See id.
6
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filings. 29  Fourth, the law gives broad latitude to agency heads in
determining contract procedures, requirements, 30  determinations and
decisions,31 and allowable costs.32
iv. Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
Chapter 5, in the simplest terms, outlines the standards of review for a
final contract decision and prohibits contract provisions from making an
administrative official's decision final as a question of law. 33
v. Service Contract Labor Standards
In Chapter 6, the government outlines wage standards for any employee
working for a contractor or subcontractor.34 Specifically, each contract
must contain provisions identifying minimum wage for various levels of
29. See 41 U.S.C. § 253b (2006).
30. See U.S.C. § 254 (2006).
[C]ontracts awarded after using procedures other than sealed-bid procedures may be of
any type which in the opinion of the agency head will promote the best interests of the
Government. Every contract awarded after using procedures other than sealed-bid
procedures shall contain a suitable warranty, as determined by the agency head, by the
contractor that no person or selling agency has been employed or retained to solicit or
secure such contract upon an agreement or understanding for a commission, percentage,
brokerage, or contingent fee, excepting bona fide employees or bona fide established
commercial or selling agencies maintained by the contractor for the purpose of securing
business, for the breach or violation of which warranty the Government shall have the
right to annul such contract without liability or in its discretion to deduct from the
contract price or consideration the full amount of such commission, percentage,
brokerage, or contingent fee. The preceding sentence does not apply to a contract for an
amount that is not greater than the simplified acquisition threshold or to a contract for the
acquisition of commercial items.
Id. § 254(a).
31. See 41 U.S.C. § 262 (2006).
32. See 41 U.S.C. § 256 (2006) (requiring agencies to ensure allowable costs during settlement with a
contractor conform to the FAR and outlines the penalties for violation of this clause).
33. See 41 U.S.C. § 322 (2006).
34. See 41 U.S.C. § 351 (2006).
2010]
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employees, 35 provisions related to fringe benefits, 36 working conditions, 37
notice of wages to proposed employees under the contract,38 and wage
restrictions. 39
vii. Contract Disputes
Chapter 9 is arguably the second most important section of the law, as it
lays the statutory framework resolving disputes between the government
35. See 41 U.S.C. § 351(a) (1) (2006).
A provision specifying the minimum monetary wages to be paid the
various classes of service employees in the performance of the contract
or any subcontract thereunder, as determined by the Secretary, or his
authorized representative, in accordance with prevailing rates for such
employees in the locality, or, where a collective-bargaining agreement
covers any such service employees, in accordance with the rates for such
employees provided for in such agreement, including prospective wage
increases provided for in such agreement as a result of arm's length
negotiations.
Id.
36. See 41 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2) (2006).
A provision specifying the fringe benefits to be furnished in the various classes of service
employees, engaged in the performance of the contract or any subcontract thereunder, as
determined by the Secretary or his authorized representative to be prevailing for such
employees in the locality, or, where a collective-bargaining agreement covers any such
service employees, to be provided for in such agreement, including prospective fringe
benefits increases provided for in such agreement as a result of arm's-length negotiations.
Such fringe benefits shall include medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or
death, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity, or
insurance to provide any of the foregoing, unemployment benefits, life insurance,
disability and sickness insurance, accident insurance, vacation and holiday pay, costs of
apprenticeship or other similar programs and other bona fide fringe benefits not otherwise
required by Federal, State, or local law to be provided by the contractor or subcontractor.
Id.
37. See 41 U.S.C. § 351(a) (3) (2006).
A provision that no part of the services covered by this chapter will be
performed in buildings or surroundings or under working conditions,
provided by or under the control or supervision of the contractor or any
subcontractor, which are unsanitary or hazardous or dangerous to the
health or safety of service employees engaged to furnish the services.
Id.
38. See 41 U.S.C. § 351(a) (4) (2006).
39. See 41 U.S.C. § 351(b) (1) (2006).
No contractor who enters into any contract with the Federal
Government the principal purpose of which is to furnish services
through the use of service employees and no subcontractor thereunder
shall pay any of his employees engaged in performing work on such
contracts less than the minimum wage specified under section 206(a)(1)
of title 29.
Id.
8
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and its contractors.40 The first major provision of the chapter frames the
process for contracting officer decision-making. 41 Second, the law gives
contractors the right to appeal a contracting officer's decision, which must
be in writing and within 90 days of receipt.42 Third, the law establishes
various agency boards of contract appeals, 43 sets the standard for judicial
review of board decisions,44 and outlines the payment of claims.45
B. The Federal Acquisition Regulations
The Federal Acquisition Regulations ("FAR") are the federal
procurement regulations. 46 The FAR is broken into eight subchapters with
fifty-three "Parts," it covers general topics including competition and
acquisition planning,47  contracting methods and types, 48  contracting
requirements, 49 and contract management. 50 The FAR is an ever-evolving
set of regulations and seeks to cover the normal course of federal
procurement actions.
II. HIGH LEVEL MONITORING? A LOOK AT THE OFFICE OF
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY, THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION
REGULATORY COUNCIL AND THE CHIEF ACQUISITIONS
OFFICERS COUNCIL
Under federal law, there are three distinct entities which impact federal
procurement policy. The entities, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy,
40. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (2006).
41. See 41 U.S.C. § 605 (2006). All contract disputes must first be presented in writing to the
Contracting Officer of said contract. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a). The Contracting Officer's decision is final
unless an authorized appeal or suit is filed. See id. Finally, the section outlines a timeframe for which
Contracting Officers must provide decisions for contracts under and over $100,000. 41 U.S.C. § 605(b).
42. See 41 U.S.C. § 606 (2006).
43. See 41 U.S.C. § 607 (2006).
44. See 41 U.S.C. § 609 (2006). A contractor may appeal a Contracting Officer's decision directly to
United States Court of Federal Claims and must be filed within twelve months. 41 U.S.C. § 609(a).
Agency boards of contract appeals decisions are final as to questions of fact, but not on issues of law.
41 U.S.C. § 609(b).
45. See 41 U.S.C. § 612 (2006). Any judgment against the United States must be paid in a timely
manner. 41 U.S.C. § 612(a). All monetary awards made by an agency board of contract appeals must
be paid promptly in accordance with said agency policies and procedure. 41 U.S.C. § 612(b).
46. See 48 C.F.R. ch.1 (2009).
47. See 48 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2009).
48. See 48 C.F.R. pts. 16-17 (2009).
49. See 48 C.F.R. pts. 27-33 (2009).
50. See 48 C.F.R. pts. 42-49 (2009).
2010]
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the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council and the Chief Acquisition
Officer Council, are statutorily mandated and are charged with varying
roles and responsibilities in federal acquisition policy and practice.
A. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) was established in
1974 as part of the Office of Management and Budget51 and is led by a
presidential-appointed Administrator.52  The OFPP is responsible for,
amongst other things, government-wide procurement policy, regulations
and the promotion of efficiency in procurement matters. 53 Some of the
more specified responsibilities of the OFPP, inter alia, include designing
uniform procurement standards government-wide, 54 setting the federal
standard for Chief Procurement Officers and other senior procurement
executives, 5 5 developing ethical standards and safeguards, 56 developing a
database of federal contract awards, 57 restricting privatization of federal
51. See 41 U.S.C. § 404(a) (2006).
52. See 41 U.S.C. § 404(b) (2006). The Administrator is appointed by the President and approved by
the United States Senate. See id.
53. 41 U.S.C. § 404(a).
There is in the Office of Management and Budget an Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (hereinafter referred to as the "Office") to provide
overall direction of Government-wide procurement policies, regulations,
procedures, and forms for executive agencies and to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the procurement of property and services
by the executive branch of the Federal Government.
Id.
54. See 41 U.S.C. § 405a (2006).
The Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy is authorized and
directed, pursuant to the authority conferred by Public Law 93-400 [41 U.S.C. 401 et
seq.] and subject to the procedures set forth in such Public Law, to promulgate a single,
simplified, uniform Federal procurement regulation and to establish procedures for
insuring compliance with such provisions by all Federal agencies.
Id.
55. See 41 U.S.C. § 414 (2006). The law establishes and outlines the functions of Chief Procurement
Officers and details the responsibilities for designated senior procurement executives. See id.
56. See 41 U.S.C. § 405c (2006).
[T]he Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy shall develop and issue a standard policy to prevent
personal conflicts of interest by contractor employees performing acquisition functions closely
associated with inherently governmental functions (including the development, award, and
administration of Government contracts) for or on behalf of a Federal agency or department.
41 U.S.C. § 405c(a) (2006).
57. See 41 U.S.C. § 417b (2006). The statute requires the OFPP Administrator to develop a database-
tracking contractors who have been involved in civil, criminal or administrative proceedings as a result
of performance of a federal contract worth over $500,000. See id
10
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workforce responsibilities, 5 8 creating an "Advocate for competition" in each
agency 59 and the authority to test innovative procurement methods and
procedures. 6
B. The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council
Title 41 of the United States Code creates the Federal Acquisition
Regulatory Council (the Council). 61 The purpose of the Council is "to
assist in the direction and coordination of Government-wide procurement
policy and Government-wide procurement regulatory activities in the
Federal Government. '62 The Council is composed of the heads of four
58. See 41 U.S.C. § 439 (2006). The statute prohibits the privatization of any function performed by 10
or more Executive agency employees unless the results are based on:
(1) A function of an executive agency performed by 10 or more agency civilian
employees may not be converted, in whole or in part, to performance by a contractor
unless the conversion is based on the results of a public-private competition that-
(A) formally compares the cost of performance of the function by agency civilian
employees with the cost of performance by a contractor;
(B) creates an agency tender, including a most efficient organization plan, in accordance
with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, as implemented on May 29,
2003, or any successor circular;
(C) includes the issuance of a solicitation;
(D) determines whether the submitted offers meet the needs of the executive agency with
respect to factors other than cost, including quality, reliability, and timeliness;
(E) examines the cost of performance of the function by agency civilian employees and
the cost of performance of the function by one or more contractors to demonstrate
whether converting to performance by a contractor will result in savings to the
Government over the life of the contract, including-
(i) the estimated cost to the Government (based on offers received) for performance of
the function by a contractor;
(ii) the estimated cost to the Government for performance of the function by agency
civilian employees; and
(iii) an estimate of all other costs and expenditures that the Government would incur
because of the award of such a contract;
(F) requires continued performance of the function by agency civilian employees unless
the difference in the cost of performance of the function by a contractor compared to the
cost of performance of the function by agency civilian employees would, over all
performance periods required by the solicitation, be equal to or exceed the lesser of-
(i) 10 percent of the personnel-related costs for performance of that function in the
agency tender; or
(ii) $10,000,000; and
(G) examines the effect of performance of the function by a contractor on the agency
mission associated with the performance of the function.
59. 41 U.S.C. § 418 (2006). The Advocate for competition is responsible for promoting full and open
competition, promoting the acquisition of commercial items, and challenging barriers to Executive
agency acquisitions. 41 U.S.C. § 418(c) (2006).
60. 41 U.S.C. § 413(a) (2006).
61. 41 U.S.C. § 421(a) (2006).
62. Id.
2010]
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separate agencies63 and is required to issue and maintain the Federal
Acquisition Regulations. 64 Further, this section of the law specifically
limits the ability of federal agencies to issue its own procurement
regulations65 and requires all regulations be consistent with the FAR.66
Finally, this section seeks to eliminate or reduce redundant or unnecessary
levels of review and approval in any agency's procurement system and
redundant or unnecessary procurement regulations unique to that agency. 67
C. The Chief Acquisitions Officers Council
Title 41 creates a second policy body to coordinate procurement policy
in the Chief Acquisitions Officers Council (the CAO Council). 68 The CAO
Council is chaired by the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of
Management and Budget and has several members from other federal
agencies. 69 Statutorily, the CAO Council is the "... principal interagency
forum for monitoring and improving the [f]ederal acquisition system."7
The CAO Council has seven major functions including developing
63. 41 U.S.C. § 421(b) (2006). The Counsel is composed of the Administrator for Federal Procurement
Policy, Secretary of the United States Department of Defense, Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Administrator of General Services. Id.
64. 41 U.S.C. § 421(c) (2006).
Subject to the provisions of section 405 of this title, the General
Services Administration, the Department of Defense, and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, pursuant to their respective
authorities under title III of the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 251, et seq.), chapters 4 and 137 of title
10, and the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. 2451,
et seq.), shall jointly issue and maintain in accordance with subsection
(f) of this section a single Government-wide procurement regulation, to
be known as the "Federal Acquisition Regulation."
41 U.S.C. § 421(c) (1) (2006).
65. 41 U.S.C. § 421(c)(2) (2006). These regulations must be limited to those essential to implementing
Government-wide policies and procedures and additional policies and procedures required to satisfy the
specific and unique needs of the agency. Id.
66. 41 U.S.C. § 421(c)(3) (2006) ("The Administrator, in consultation with the Council, shall ensure
that procurement regulations promulgated by executive agencies are consistent with the Federal
Acquisition Regulation and in accordance with any policies issued pursuant to section 405 (a) of this
title.").
67. 41 U.S.C. § 421(d) (3) (a-b) (2006).
68. 41 U.S.C. § 414b(a)(2006).
69. 41 U.S.C. § 414b(b) (2006). The CAO Council consists of the Deputy Director for Management of
the Office of Management and Budget; the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy; the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the chief acquisition officer of each
agency required to have said position under Title 41; the senior procurement executive of each military
department; and any other senior agency officer of each executive agency, appointed by the head of the
agency with consultation with the Chairman, who can assist the Council in performing its functions. Id.
70. 41 U.S.C. § 414b(d) (2006).
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recommendations to the OMB Director, promoting effective business
practices and sharing business experiences and ideas.71
III. THE PROBLEM: OUT OF CONTROL FEDERAL CONTRACTING
The global economy has been under strain like never before. 72 This
economic crisis originated with the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, then
expanded into a reversal of the housing boom and other issues related to the
credit markets.73  To stave off a complete collapse of the American
economy, the U.S. government passed various legislation, 74 including the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).75 The ARRA
allowed the Federal Government to spend over $787 billion to stabilize the
American economy. Of that total sum, $275 billion was set aside for
federal contracts, grants and loans. 76 To date, $26,498,869,058 has been
71. 41 U.S.C. § 414b(e) (2006).
The Council shall perform functions that include the following:
(1) Develop recommendations for the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
on Federal acquisition policies and requirements.
(2) Share experiences, ideas, best practices, and innovative approaches related to Federal
acquisition.
(3) Assist the Administrator in the identification, development, and coordination of
multiagency projects and other innovative initiatives to improve Federal acquisition.
(4) Promote effective business practices that ensure the timely delivery of best value
products to the Federal Government and achieve appropriate public policy objectives.
(5) Further integrity, fairness, competition, openness, and efficiency in the Federal
acquisition system.
(6) Work with the Office of Personnel Management to assess and address the hiring,
training, and professional development needs of the Federal Government related to
acquisition.
(7) Work with the Administrator and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council to
promote the business practices referred to in paragraph (4) and other results of the
functions carried out under this subsection."
Id.
72. See generally Anup Shah, Global Financial Crisis, Global Issues, July 25, 2009,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis.
73. Id.
74. See e.g. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L 110-143, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act created the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2008). TARP was a program created to
allow the United States government to purchase "troubled assets" from private financial institutions in
order to stabilize each private financial institutions financial situation. Id.
75. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115. The full title to
the law reads "An act making supplemental appropriations for job preservation and creation,
infrastructure investment, energy efficiency and science, assistance to the unemployed, and State and
local fiscal stabilization, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2009, and for other purposes." Id.
76. See id.
2010]
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made specifically available for contracts. 77 The United States Government
Accountability Office, congressionally mandated to audit ARRA funds and
utilization, issued a critical report around the monitoring of awarded
contracts.
78
Over the last decade, the United States has been involved in wars in
Afghanistan 79 and Iraq. 80 These wars have taken a definitive financial toll
on the Federal Government, as total spending has gone over $1 trillion
dollars. 81 From 2004 through 2006, the Federal Government spent $11
billion, $17 billion and $25 billion on contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq.82
Given the values of these contracts, a number of concerns surfaced
regarding fraud, abuse and waste.8 3 In response, a bipartisan, Congressional
committee was formed to looking into these issues. 84 The Commission on
77. Recovery.gov, Where is the money going?,
http://www.recovery.gov/Transparency/RecipientReportedData/Pages/RecipientReportedDataMap.aspx
(last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
78. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 09-1016, RECOVERY Act (Sept. 2009). The
GAO made three recommendations: 1) clearer accountability for recipient financial data; 2) program-
specific examples of recipient reports, outreach to nonfederal recipients, and further guidance on
program performance measures; and 3) timely notification of funding provided within a state to key
state officials and a master schedule for anticipated new or revised federal agency guidance. Id.
79. Craig Whitlock, Kandahar Offensive Not on Schedule; McChrystal says Efforts Could Take Months
Longer than Expected, WASH. POST, June 11, 2010, at Al.
80. Mary Beth Sheridan and Ernest Lodono, Self Sufficiency Still Eludes Domestic Security Forces,
WASH. POST, Nov, 9, 2008, at Al.
81. See Richard Wolf, Afghan War Costs Now outpaces Iraq's, USA TODAY, May 13, 2010, at Al.
Pentagon spending in February, the most recent month available, was $6.7 billion in
Afghanistan compared with $5.5 billion in Iraq. As recently as fiscal year 2008, Iraq was
three times as expensive; in 2009, it was twice as costly. The shift is occurring because
the Pentagon is adding troops in Afghanistan and withdrawing them from Iraq. And it's
happening as the cumulative cost of the two wars surpasses $1 trillion, including
spending for veterans and foreign aid.
Id.
82. Bill Buzenberg, The Top 100 Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,
Jan. 2008.
83. Khadijah Rentas, Senate Agrees to Audit War Contracts, COLUM. MISSOURIAN, Oct. 1, 2007.
In July, the House Armed Services Committee heard from Defense Department officials
who said the department had 90 ongoing criminal investigations of contractors and
government personnel. The department recovered more than $10 million from
investigations, according to the report from the principal deputy inspector of the
Department of Defense, Thomas Gimble.
Id.
84. Comm'n On Wartime Contracting, http://www.wartimecontracting.gov (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
Members of the Commission were appointed by President George W. Bush, United States Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid, United States Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, United States
House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi and United States House Minority Leader John
Boehner. Id.
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Wartime Contracting released its first report on September 21, 2009, with
the overall finding that Department of Defense agencies needed to improve
oversight of contractor business systems to reduce fraud, waste, and
abuse."
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, considered one of the worst
natural disasters in American history, made landfall in the Eastern Gulf of
Mexico region.86  Hurricane Katrina, a Category 4 Storm, displaced
thousands of people in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama 87 and caused
over $2 billion in damages.88 To assist in the reconstruction of the region,
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), part of the
Department of Homeland Security, distributed over $33 billion by late
2007. 89 FEMA awarded $8.8 billion in contracts related to hurricane
damage, mostly for Katrina victims.90 Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA
failed to award contracts to vendors to provide post-disaster housing.
Subsequent to Hurricane Katrina, to meet the emergent need, FEMA
awarded four no-bid contracts, which eventually totaled $3 billion.91 A
85. COMM'N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, SPEC. REP. ON CONTRACTOR
Bus. Sys., (Sept. 21, 2009). The Commission made five specific findings, including the Department of
Defense needed to ensure the government spoke to contractors with one voice; the Department of
Defense needed to improve government accountability by rapidly resolving agency conflicts on business
systems; the Defense Contract Audit Agency needed to expand its audit reports beyond a pass/fail
opinion; the Defense Contract Management Agency needed to develop effective processes including
aggressive compliance enforcement; the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Contract
Management Agency needed to request additional resources and prioritize contingency-contractor
oversight workload. Id.
86. H.R. REP. No. 109-396, at 92, 397 (2006).
87. See Brian Handwerk, Eye ofthe Storm: Hurricane Katrina Fast Facts, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS,
Sept. 6, 2005, http://news.nationalgeographic.com (search article title in site search box); Michelle
Krupa, Katrina's Displaced Worry About Census Count, Nola.com, July 25, 2009, http://nola.com
(search article title in search box).
88. See Lloyd's Estimates Katrina Impact at $2.54 Billion, INS. J., Sept. 15, 2005,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/intemational/2005/09/15/59634.htm.
89. See Press Release, Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA Reforms Maintenance and
Deactivation of Housing Contracts Post Katrina, (Nov. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.fema.gov/newsrelease.fema?id=41717; Peter T. Leeson & Russell S. Sobel, Weathering
Corruption, 51 J.L. & ECON. 667,678 (2008).
90. See FEMA: GAO Report on Katrina/Rita Maintenance and Deactivation of Housing Contracts Post
Katrina, http://www.fema.gov/media/archives/2007/111607.shtm.
91. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., INEFFECTIVE FEMA OVERSIGHT OF HOUSING
MAINTENANCE CONTRACTS IN MISSISSIPPI RESULTED IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF WASTE AND
POTENTIAL FRAUD, GAO No. 08-106, at 9 (2007).
FEMA was in the process of competing this contract - bids had been solicited and
evaluated, but n o contract was in place. Therefore, FEMA awarded 'no-bid' contracts to
four major engineering firms (Bechtel Corporation, Fluor Corporation, the Shaw Group
Incorporated, and CH2M Hill Incorporated) for, among other things, the support of
staging areas for housing units, installation of housing units, maintenance and upkeep,
2010]
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report released by the United States Government Accountability Office
criticized FEMA for the contracts awarded in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina and outlined millions of dollars of waste.92
IV. GETTING TO A BRIGHTER DAY: LEGAL AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A BETTER FEDERAL PROCUREMENT
SYSTEM
There are five legislative and policy recommendations which may assist
in restoring efficiency and the public trust in the federal procurement
system. For the most part, these recommendations seek to utilize existing
institutions within the law to achieve the majority of these changes.
A. Amend Title 41 to elevate the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to a
stand alone agency
In its establishment, Title 41 directs the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy to "provide overall direction of Government-wide procurement
policies, regulations, procedures, and forms for executive agencies and to
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the procurement of
property and services by the executive branch of the Federal
Government. ' 93 The statutory language gives the OFPP broad power over
the federal procurement process. However, there is little evidence that this
control is impacting federal contracting. The lack of impact on the federal
procurement process could stem from the diminutive nature of the OFPP.
As of today, there is no cabinet-level agency dedicated solely to
developing, implementing and monitoring procurement policy. There
seems to be little or no real coordination for procurement activities
throughout the Federal Government. At the agency level there may be
internal controls, but where is the government-wide coordination
envisioned in the establishment of OFPP? A review of a newspaper or
site inspections and preparations, site restoration, group site design, group site
construction, site assessments, property and facility management, as well as housing unit
deactivation and rehabilitation. In total, FEMA made almost $3 billion in payments to
Bechtel, Fluor, Shaw and CH2M Hill from September 2005 to January 2007.
Id.
92. See id. at 3 (reporting that FEMA essentially wasted $32 million on post-Katrina contracts through
poor monitoring and improper activities).
93. 41 U.S.C. § 404 (2006).
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magazine will prove that agencies such as the Departments of Defense or
State function as they choose, with very little accountability for their
actions.
One answer to this problem may be found in amending Title 41 and
elevating the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to a stand-alone agency.
One agency should be given the power and authority to coordinate all facets
of federal procurement. Any reform of the federal procurement system
must begin with identifying a sole entity empowered to oversee and
coordinate those efforts. A single entity charged with instilling consistency,
continuity, efficiency, and proficiency in procurement matters can make
accountability actually possible. This single entity could be held
accountable if procurement disasters occur, such as the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. The single entity would be responsible for holding each
agency's procurement operation accountable for the contracts they award
and manage. Assuredly, there is not an entity currently with that level of
authority in the Federal Government.
Some would argue that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy is
already dedicated solely to procurement issues. However, OFPP is merely
part of the Office of Management and Budget. 94 Elevating OFPP to a
stand-alone agency and giving it true authority over procurement is the best
answer. In its current form, OFPP is not sufficiently impacting
procurement within various agencies. OFPP has not made a difference with
wartime procurement nor has it affected the contracts awarded as part of the
ARRA. Thus, for anyone to argue that OFPP's current authority is
sufficient makes little sense.
Ideally, once elevated, OFPP could take a stronger hand in oversight of
the federal procurement system. Some suggested oversight methods
include requiring all agencies to submit an annual acquisition plan, with
quarterly updates; copies, and annual updates of, each agency's
Procurement Standard Operating Procedures; obligate each agency to
provide a procurement organizational chart and personnel qualifications;
annual reports from each agency detailing procurement strengths,
weaknesses, changes, audit findings, and assessing whether it met the
objectives of its acquisition plan. Finally, the OFPP could submit an
Annual Federal Procurement Report to the President detailing the
information learned from the various exercises, provide guidance as to how
the information should be construed, and suggest statutory and policy
94. Id.
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improvements. Every agency would be required to justify its acquisition
plan and prove the efficacy of its procurement system.
B. Amend Title 41 to redesign and expand the role of the Federal
Acquisition Regulatory Council
The Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council serves as a government-
wide procurement policy group. 95 As previously noted, it is primarily
composed of the OFPP Administrator, Secretary of Defense, Administrators
of the General Services Administrator and NASA.96 Generally speaking,
this is a powerful group of executives, who are responsible for large,
diverse government agencies. To use such a powerful group merely to
maintain the FAR and vet agency procurement regulations seems wasteful.
A better use of this group's time and resources should revolve around a
greater leadership role in monitoring and assessing the procurement system.
Specifically, there are two additional tasks that should be assigned to the
group and one of its standing responsibilities should be revised. The
Counsel should conduct an annual procurement system-wide audit, create
an annual report, and revise the FAR maintenance.
The in-depth annual audit would focus on assessing whether established
procurement policies and procedures were followed, procurement actions
properly and appropriately funded, solicitations properly and appropriately
utilized, contract actions managed and monitored, files maintained and
contracts properly closed out. The review would be conducted annually
with a random sampling from every agency. A final audit report would be
prepared and submitted to the OFPP for assessment and inclusion in the
OFPP Annual Procurement Report. Given the size and depth of such an
audit, a private contractor would be best to assist in managing this process.
Obviously, the selected contractor could not be an existing vendor or
maintain any other federal contract.
The second task would focus on an annual report to the President and
Congress on the results of the annual review. Based on the results of the
annual review, the report would make specific legislative, policy and
procedural recommendations. This article has advocated greater authority
for the OFPP and seemingly, it would make sense that the findings should
go there. However, it places additional pressure on the OFPP and federal
agencies to improve process and make sound procurement decisions when
95. 41 U.S.C. § 421(a) (2006).
96. 41 U.S.C. § 421(b) (2006).
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there is an understanding that the findings are being reviewed at the highest
levels of government.
Third, the group's FAR maintenance responsibility should be enhanced.
Specifically, a sup-group of representatives of the current members and
representatives from the Chief Acquisition Officers Council should be
developed. This is crucial, as the Chief Acquisition Officers utilize the
FAR on a daily basis and are in the best position to advise the larger group
on necessary changes and improvements.
The annual review would force agencies to pay greater attention to its
procurement operations, especially understanding that the results will be
published in a report to the President and Congress. The review would help
identify areas of weakness and can only serve to make procurement more
robust.
C. Amend Title 41 and redesign and expand the role of the Chief
Acquisition Officers Council
The Chief Acquisition Officers Council is tasked with serving as a forum
for policy and idea development.97 With a forum this large, and with so
much procurement expertise in one standing group, it does not make sense
to waste such an opportunity. As the Chief Acquisitions Officers work on a
daily basis with the vast majority of procurement personnel, they have a
unique perspective. As such, the statute should be amended and the group
given purview over two important issues: personnel performance metrics
and staff training.
The CAO Council should research, develop, and assist with
implementation of annual procurement personnel performance metrics
government-wide. Specifically, the performance metrics for all Series 1102
employees would be delegated to this group. Some interesting performance
metrics could include statement of work/solicitation development, quality
control, timeliness of contract activities, file performance for internal and
external audits, and timely contract close out. Ideally, the CAO Council
would spend the majority of the Fiscal Year reviewing data. The data
would include audit results, legislative and regulatory changes and policy
developments. Once the review is complete, the metrics would be
distributed to procurement personnel 90 days prior to the end of the Fiscal
Year.
97. See 41 U.S.C. § 414(b) (2006).
2010]
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Second, under the proposed changes, the CAO Council would develop
and implement an annual procurement training plan. Utilizing the same
data used in developing the performance metrics, the CAO Council would
outline areas in need of intensive training. All Series 1102 employees
would be required, as a condition of continued employment, to meet the
requirements of the annual training plan. The training could be a
combination of in-person or online modules and each agency would be
required to track and certify that each employee has complied with the
training plan. The training would focus on cradle to grave contract
administration issues, policy and legislative updates, and customer service
training.
These two issues are critical for building efficiency in federal
contracting. First, performance metrics are a positive, simple way to ensure
procurement personnel are following unified standards throughout the
government. These standards should lead to better, more cost effective
procurement outcomes and create a level of consistency throughout the
Federal Government. Second, ensuring a standardized training plan is
critical for procurement continuity. Through this method, procurement
professionals throughout the Federal Government will receive the training
they need to manage the contracting process and will lead to fewer errors
and more creative approaches to ensuring efficiency. Finally, choosing the
CAO Council to handle these functions just makes good business sense.
Daily, these representatives are managing procurement operations
throughout the government and see the problems on a first hand basis.
These individuals are most likely to develop methods which are reasonable,
appropriate, and protect the government's interests.
D. Creation of a unified procurement database for all contracting activities
Currently, the United States government uses a number of different
databases for its various procurement operations. In fact, the government
utilizes six different databases for these activities. For example, there is the
Central Contractor Registration database,98 the Excluded Parties List
98. See Central Contractor Registration (CCR) Policy, Central Contractor Registration,
https://www.bpn.gov/cc/CCRPol.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
Central Contractor Registration (CCR) is the primary registrant database for the U.S.
Federal Government. CCR collects, validates, stores, and disseminates data in support of
agency acquisition missions, including Federal agency contract and assistance awards.
Please note that the term "assistance award" includes grants, cooperative agreements and
other forms of federal assistance. Whether applying for assistance awards, contracts, or
20
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System,99 Electronic Subcontracting Reporting System, 100 the Federal
Procurement Data System, 10 1 the Online Representations and Certifications
Applications, 1°2 and the Past Performance Information Retrieval System. 103
It makes little sense to have six different databases of related information
that are not connected. Thus, the Federal Government should develop and
implement a unified contracts system with multiple modules. The database
modules should include a contract writing system, automated contract files,
contract management and evaluation modules, contractor registration and a
contractor performance/discipline module. Each federal agency would be
required to enter all contracts-related information and all audits would be
conducted using only information generated from the electronic system for
sample development and testing to enforce utilization of the system. A
web-based system could be utilized to control cost, ensure seamless
implementation and provide easy access for all federal agencies.
The OFPP should manage the proposed system because of the expanded
coordinating role in the procurement arena as proposed in the article.
The proposed database system creates efficiencies and reduces
redundancies by placing information in one system versus six and is
managed by a single entity, rather than seven. It also ensures all federal
agencies are privy to the same contractor performance information, which is
a critical component in the pre-award phase of contracting. Finally, quite
other business opportunities, all entities are considered "registrants."
Id.; see also 48 C.F.R. § 4.11 (2009) (FAR 4.11 requires prospective vendors to register in the Central
Contractor Registration database prior to the award of a contract).
Id.
99. See generally EXCLUDED PARTIES LIST SYSTEM, http://www.epls.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
The website is maintained by the General Services Administration and chronicles parties banned from
receiving Federal Government contracts. See id.
100. See generally ELECTRONIC SUBCONTRACTING REPORTING SYSTEM, http://www.esrs.gov (last
visited Nov. 13, 2010). This database was developed as a way for the government to attract its
subcontracting accomplishments. See id. The Small Business Administration, Integrated Acquisition
Environment and other agencies collaborated to develop the system. See id
101. Federal Procurement Database System, Frequently Asked Questions,
https://www.fpds.gov/wiki/index2.php/FPDS-NG FAQ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010) (each contract
awarded over $3,000, or could be over $3,000, must be reported).
102. See Frequently Asked Questions, ONLINE REPRESENTATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS APPLICATION,
http://www.orca.bpn.gov/miscl/faq.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). The Online Representation and
Certification Application is a one-stop database whereby contractors can electronically file the
representations and certifications, which are necessary with large federal contracts. See id
103. See Past Performance Information Retrieval System, http://www.ppirs.gov (last visited Nov. 13,
2010). This database holds the past performance information for all federal contractors. See id.
According to the website, in accordance with the FAR, effective July 1, 2009, all contractor evaluation
information must be entered into the database. See id
2010]
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simply, it is cheaper to maintain one electronic system than it is to maintain
six systems.
E. Amend Title 41 and the FAR to require OFPP approval of contract
awards over a specified dollar amount
Federal agencies, within their budget authority and executive's
discretion, approve contracts a number of different ways. Currently, there
is no unifying regulation with regard to the approval of contract awards
over a specified dollar amount or any external review of these awards. The
value of this proposed legislative change is that it will force agencies to
justify every aspect of the contracting process. The statutory change would
require agencies to submit finalized contracts over $50 million to OFPP for
approval. The legislation would also outline a timeframe for OFPP's
approval, so as to allow agencies to conduct proper acquisition planning.
There are a number of options available for developing and
implementing such an approval process. Submitting contracts to Congress
for approval would bring the contracting process to a halt and would further
politicize federal contracting. Seemingly, there are three agencies capable
of serving in this capacity: the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy. The Government Accountability Office would not be
the best choice because it serves as the investigative arm of Congress. 10 4
The Office of Management and Budget serves as the President's budget
office and also evaluates the efficacy of executive agency rules, regulations
and policy. 1° 5 Thus, the OFPP seems to be the more logical choice to
administer the proposed system.
The proposed statutory and regulatory changes would require agencies to
submit finalized contracts over $50 million to OFPP for approval. The
legislation would also outline a timeframe for OFPP's approval, so as to
allow agencies to plan properly. This requirement would make agencies
104. See generally Government Accountability Office, http://www.gao.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
105. The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization role/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2010).
OMB's predominant mission is to assist the President in overseeing the preparation of the
federal budget and to supervise its administration in Executive Branch agencies. In
helping to formulate the President's spending plans, OMB evaluates the effectiveness of
agency programs, policies, and procedures, assesses competing funding demands among
agencies, and sets funding priorities.
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more accountable by forcing them to explain contracting actions to a third
party and would seemingly make it more difficult to award fraudulent,
wasteful or legally questionable contracts.
F. Amend Title 41 and the FAR to restrict procurement regulations to only
the Federal Acquisition Regulations
Currently, there are over 32 different agency procurement regulations in
addition to the FAR.106  As an example, nine sub agencies of the
Department of Defense have published their own procurement
regulations. 107 It makes very little sense to allow agencies to contribute to
the confusion seemingly surrounding federal procurement. Every agency
should follow a unified set of regulations, the FAR, with no exception.
While some may argue these additional regulations must meet stringent
requirements, there is still an even simpler truth. To date, there is no
empirical evidence proving maintenance of separate procurement
regulations reduces fraud and improves fiscal accountability. The
Department of Homeland Security has its own procurement regulations and
still mismanaged contracting for Hurricane Katrina disaster relief. The
Department of Defense has multiple regulations and yet, wartime
contracting has resulted in chaos. Federal contracting is no more efficient
or cost effective by allowing agencies to promulgate their own procurement
regulations. If that is the case, there is no practical reason to continue the
practice. By only following the FAR, continuity and consistency becomes
assured throughout the Federal Government.
106. See generally Federal Acquisition Regulation Site, http://farsite.hill.af.mil (last visited Nov. 13,
2010). The following entities have their own procurement regulations in addition to the FAR: United
States Department of the Army, the United States Air Force, United States Air Force Material
Command, United States Air Force Command, United States Department of Agriculture, United States
Agency for International Development, United States Department of Commerce, Defense Information
System Agency, United States Department of Energy, United States Department of Defense, United
States Department of the Interior, Defense Logistics Agency, United States Department of Labor, United
States Department of State, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of
Education, United States Environmental Protection Agency, United States Office of Personnel
Management, the General Services Administration, United States Department of Health and Human
Services, United States Department of Homeland Security, United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development, United States Broadcasting Board of Governors, United States Department of
Justice, Department of the Navy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, United States Department of Transportation, United States Special Operations
Command, United States Transportation Command and the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs. Id.
107. Id. The nine agencies are United States Department of the Army, the United States Air Force,
United States Air Force Material Command, United States Air Force Command, Defense Information
System Agency, Department of the Navy and the United States Special Operations Command. Id.
2010]
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V. CONCLUSION
More and more of the United States governmental budget is being
consumed by contracting. However, federal procurement activities lack
oversight, are wasteful and unruly. The contracting woes from Hurricane
Katrina, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and contracts awarded through
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, underscore the serious need
for legislative and policy changes. By elevating the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy to a cabinet-level agency, re-crafting and expanding the
roles of the Federal Acquisition Regulations Council and the Chief
Acquisition Officers Council, creating a unified electronic procurement
system and eliminating agency specific procurement regulations, the
government can take practical steps toward a more efficient and fiscally
sound procurement system. In the current financial crisis facing this
country, a more efficient procurement system is not just a goal but also a
necessity.
24
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 14 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol14/iss2/5
